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Abstract
Early detection of cyber-attacks is crucial for a safe and reliable operation of the smart grid. In the literature, outlier detection
schemes making sample-by-sample decisions and online detection schemes requiring perfect attack models have been proposed. In
this paper, we formulate the online attack/anomaly detection problem as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
problem and propose a universal robust online detection algorithm using the framework of model-free reinforcement learning (RL)
for POMDPs. Numerical studies illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed RL-based algorithm in timely and accurate detection
of cyber-attacks targeting the smart grid.
Index Terms
Smart grid, model-free reinforcement learning, partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), cyber-attack, online
detection, Kalman filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Related Work
The next generation power grid, i.e., the smart grid, relies on advanced control and communication technologies. This
critical cyber infrastructure makes the smart grid vulnerable to hostile cyber-attacks [1]–[3]. Main objective of attackers is
to damage/mislead the state estimation mechanism in the smart grid to cause wide-area power blackouts or to manipulate
electricity market prices [4]. There are many types of cyber-attacks, among them false data injection (FDI), jamming, and
denial of service (DoS) attacks are well known. FDI attacks add malicious fake data to meter measurements [5]–[8], jamming
attacks corrupt meter measurements via additive noise [9], and DoS attacks block the access of system to meter measurements
[8], [10], [11].
The smart grid is a complex network and any failure or anomaly in a part of the system may lead to huge damages on the
overall system in a short period of time. Hence, early detection of cyber-attacks is critical for a timely and effective response. In
this context, the framework of quickest change detection [12]–[15] is quite useful. In the quickest change detection problems,
a change occurs in the sensing environment at an unknown time and the aim is to detect the change as soon as possible with
the minimal level of false alarms based on the measurements that become available sequentially over time. After obtaining
measurements at a given time, decision maker either declares a change or waits for the next time interval to have further
measurements. In general, as the desired detection accuracy increases, detection speed decreases. Hence, the stopping time, at
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2which a change is declared, should be chosen to optimally balance the tradeoff between the detection speed and the detection
accuracy.
If the probability density functions (pdfs) of meter measurements for the pre-change, i.e., normal system operation, and
the post-change, i.e., after an attack/anomaly, cases can be modeled sufficiently accurately, the well-known cumulative sum
(CUSUM) test is the optimal online detector [16] based on the Lorden’s criterion [17]. Moreover, if the pdfs can be modeled
with some unknown parameters, the generalized CUSUM test, which makes use of the estimates of unknown parameters, has
asymptotic optimality properties [13]. However, CUSUM-based detection schemes require perfect models for both the pre-
and post-change cases. In practice, capabilities of an attacker and correspondingly attack types and strategies can be totally
unknown. For instance, an attacker can arbitrarily combine and launch multiple attacks simultaneously or it can launch a new
unknown type of attack. Then, it may not be always possible to know the attacking strategies ahead of time and to accurately
model the post-change case. Hence, universal detectors, not requiring any attack model, are needed in general. Moreover, the
(generalized) CUSUM algorithm has optimality properties in minimizing a least favorable (worst-case) detection delay subject
to false alarm constraints [13], [16]. Since the worst case detection delay is a pessimistic metric, it is, in general, possible to
obtain algorithms performing better than the (generalized) CUSUM algorithm.
Considering the pre-change and the post-change cases as hidden states due to the unknown change-point, a quickest change
detection problem can be formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) problem. For the problem of
online attack/anomaly detection in the smart grid, in the pre-change state, the system is operated under normal conditions and
using the system model, the pre-change measurement pdf can be specified highly accurately. On the other hand, the post-change
measurement pdf can take different unknown forms depending on the attacker’s strategy. Furthermore, the transition probability
between the hidden states is unknown in general. Hence, the exact model of the POMDP is unknown.
Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms are known to be effective in controlling uncertain environments. Hence, the described
POMDP problem can be effectively solved using RL. In particular, as a solution, either the underlying POMDP model can
be learned and then a model-based RL algorithm for POMDPs [18], [19] can be used or a model-free RL algorithm [20]–
[24] can be used without learning the underlying model. Since the model-based approach requires a two-step solution that is
computationally more demanding and only an approximate model can be learned in general, we prefer to use the model-free
RL approach.
Outlier detection schemes such as the Euclidean detector [25] and the cosine-similarity metric based detector [26] are universal
as they do not require any attack model. They mainly compute a dissimilarity metric between actual meter measurements and
predicted measurements (by the Kalman filter) and declare an attack/anomaly if the amount of dissimilarity exceeds a certain
predefined threshold. However, such detectors do not consider temporal relation between attacked/anomalous measurements
and make sample-by-sample decisions. Hence, they are unable to distinguish instantaneous high-level random system noise
from long-term (persistent) anomalies caused, e.g., by an unfriendly intervention to the system. Hence, compared to the outlier
detection schemes, more reliable universal attack detection schemes are needed.
In this work, we consider the smart grid security problem from the defender’s perspective and seek for an effective detection
scheme using RL techniques (single-agent RL). Note that the problem can be considered from an attacker’s perspective as
3well, where the objective would be to determine the attacking strategies leading to the maximum possible damage on the
system. Such a problem can be particularly useful in vulnerability analysis, i.e., to identify the worst possible damage an
attacker may introduce to the system and accordingly to take necessary precautions. In the literature, several studies investigate
vulnerability analyses using RL, see e.g., [27] for FDI attacks and [28] for sequential network topology attacks. We further
note that the problem can also be considered from both defender’s and attacker’s perspectives simultaneously, that corresponds
to a game-theoretic setting.
Extension of single-agent RL to multiple agents is the multi-agent RL framework that quite involves game theory since
in this case, the optimal policies of agents depend both on the environment and the policies of the other agents. Moreover,
stochastic games extend the Markov decision processes to multi-agent case where the game is sequential and consists of
multiple states, and the transition from one state to another and also the payoffs (rewards/costs) depend on joint actions of
all agents. Several RL-based solution approaches have been proposed for stochastic games, see e.g., [29]–[33]. Further, if the
game (the underlying state of the environment, actions and payoffs of other agents, etc.) is partially observed, then it is called
a partially observable stochastic game, for which finding a solution is more difficult in general.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we propose an online cyber-attack detection algorithm using the framework of model-free RL for POMDPs.
The proposed algorithm is universal, i.e., it does not require attack models. This makes the proposed scheme widely applicable
and also proactive in the sense that new unknown attack types can be detected. Since we follow a model-free RL approach,
the defender learns a direct mapping from observations to actions (stop or continue) by trial-and-error. In the training phase,
although it is possible to obtain/generate observation data for the pre-change case using the system model under normal
operating conditions, it is generally difficult to obtain real attack data. For this reason, we follow a robust detection approach
by training the defender with low-magnitude attacks that corresponds to the worst-case scenarios from a defender’s perspective
since such attacks are quite difficult to detect. Then, the trained defender becomes sensitive to detect slight deviations of meter
measurements from the normal system operation. The robust detection approach significantly limits the action space of an
attacker as well. That is, to prevent the detection, an attacker can only exploit very low attack magnitudes that are practically
not much of interest due to their minimal damage on the system. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt
for online cyber-attack detection in the smart grid using RL techniques.
C. Organization and Notation
We introduce the system model and the state estimation mechanism in Sec. II. We present the problem formulation in Sec. III
and the proposed solution approach in Sec. IV. We then illustrate the performance of the proposed RL-based detection scheme
via extensive simulations in Sec. V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. VI. Boldface letters denote vectors and matrices,
all vectors are column vectors, and oT denotes the transpose of o. P and E denote the probability and expectation operators,
respectively. Table I summarizes the common symbols and parameters used in the paper.
4Symbol Meaning
Γ Stopping time
τ Change-point
I Number of quantization levels
M Window size
Q(o, a) Q-value corresponding to observation-action pair (o, a)
α Learning rate
 Exploration rate
T Maximum length of a learning episode
E Number of learning episodes
TABLE I: Common symbols/parameters in the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND STATE ESTIMATION
A. System Model
Suppose that there are K meters in a power grid consisting of N + 1 buses, where usually K > N to have the necessary
measurement redundancy against noise [34]. One of the buses is considered as a reference bus and the system state at time
t is denoted with xt = [x1,t, . . . , xN,t]T where xn,t denotes the phase angle at bus n at time t. Let the measurement taken
at meter k at time t be denoted with yk,t and the measurement vector be denoted with yt = [y1,t, . . . , yK,t]T. Based on the
widely used linear DC model [34], we model the smart grid with the following state-space equations:
xt = Axt−1 + vt, (1)
yt = Hxt +wt, (2)
where A ∈ RN×N is the system (state transition) matrix, H ∈ RK×N is the measurement matrix determined based on
the network topology, vt = [v1,t, . . . , vN,t]T is the process noise vector, and wt = [w1,t, . . . , wK,t]T is the measurement
noise vector. We assume that vt and wt are independent additive white Gaussian random processes where vt ∼ N (0, σ2v IN ),
wt ∼ N (0, σ2w IK), and IK ∈ RK×K is an identity matrix. Moreover, we assume that the system is observable, i.e., the
observability matrix
O ,
 HHA...
HAN−1

has rank N .
The system model given in (1) and (2) corresponds to the normal system operation. In case of a cyber-attack, however, the
measurement model in (2) is no longer true. For instance,
1) in case of an FDI attack launched at time τ , the measurement model can be written as
yt = Hxt +wt + bt11{t ≥ τ},
where 11 is an indicator function and bt , [b1,t, . . . , bK,t]T denotes the injected malicious data at time t ≥ τ and bk,t
denotes the injected false datum to the kth meter at time t,
52) in case of a jamming attack with additive noise, the measurement model can be written as
yt = Hxt +wt + ut11{t ≥ τ},
where ut , [u1,t, . . . , uK,t]T denotes the random noise realization at time t ≥ τ and uk,t denotes the jamming noise
corrupting the kth meter at time t,
3) in case of a hybrid FDI/jamming attack [9], the meter measurements take the following form:
yt = Hxt +wt + (bt + ut)11{t ≥ τ},
4) in case of a DoS attack, meter measurements can be partially unavailable to the system controller. The measurement
model can then be written as
yt = Dt(Hxt +wt),
where Dt = diag(d1,t, . . . , dK,t) is a diagonal matrix consisting of 0s and 1s. Particularly, if yk,t is available, then
dk,t = 1, otherwise dk,t = 0. Note that Dt = IK for t < τ ,
5) in case of a network topology attack, the measurement matrix changes. Denoting the measurement matrix under topology
attack at time t ≥ τ by H¯t, we have
yt =

Hxt +wt, if t < τ
H¯txt +wt, if t ≥ τ,
6) in case of a mixed topology and hybrid FDI/jamming attack, the measurement model can be written as follows:
yt =

Hxt +wt, if t < τ
H¯txt +wt + bt + ut, if t ≥ τ.
B. State Estimation
Since the smart grid is regulated based on estimated system states, state estimation is a fundamental task in the smart grid,
that is conventionally performed using the static least squares (LS) estimators [5], [6], [35]. However, in practice, the smart
grid is a highly dynamic system due to time-varying load and power generation [36]. Furthermore, time-varying cyber-attacks
can be designed and performed by the adversaries. Hence, dynamic system modeling as in (1) and (2) and correspondingly
using a dynamic state estimator can be quite useful for real-time operation and security of the smart grid [8], [9].
For a discrete-time linear dynamic system, if the noise terms are Gaussian, the Kalman filter is the optimal linear estimator
in minimizing the mean squared state estimation error [37]. Note that for the Kalman filter to work correctly, the system needs
to be observable. The Kalman filter is an online estimator consisting of prediction and measurement update steps at each
iteration. Denoting the state estimates at time t with xˆt|t′ where t′ = t − 1 and t′ = t for the prediction and measurement
update steps, respectively, the Kalman filter equations at time t can be written as follows:
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Fig. 1: Mean squared state estimation error vs. time where random FDI attacks with various magnitude levels are launched at
time τ = 100.
Prediction:
xˆt|t−1 = Axˆt−1|t−1,
Ft|t−1 = AFt−1|t−1AT + σ2v IN , (3)
Measurement update:
Gt = Ft|t−1HT(HFt|t−1HT + σ2w IK)
−1,
xˆt|t = xˆt|t−1 +Gt(yt −Hxˆt|t−1),
Ft|t = Ft|t−1 −GtHFt|t−1, (4)
where Ft|t−1 and Ft|t denote the estimates of the state covariance matrix based on the measurements up to t − 1 and t,
respectively. Moreover, Gt is the Kalman gain matrix at time t.
We next demonstrate the effect of cyber-attacks on the state estimation mechanism via an illustrative example. We consider
a random FDI attack with various magnitude/intensity levels and show how the mean squared state estimation error of the
Kalman filter changes when FDI attacks are launched to the system. We assume that the attacks are launched at τ = 100, i.e.,
the system is operated under normal (non-anomalous) conditions up to time 100 and under attacking conditions afterwards.
Three attack magnitude levels are considered:
• Level 1: bk,t ∼ U [−0.04, 0.04], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀t ≥ τ ,
• Level 2: bk,t ∼ U [−0.07, 0.07], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀t ≥ τ ,
• Level 3: bk,t ∼ U [−0.1, 0.1], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀t ≥ τ ,
where U [ζ1, ζ2] denotes a uniform random variable in the range of [ζ1, ζ2]. The corresponding mean squared error (MSE)
versus time curves are presented in Fig. 1. We observe that in case of cyber-attacks, the state estimates are deviated from the
actual system states where the amount of deviation increases as the attack magnitudes get larger.
7III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Before we introduce our problem formulation, we briefly explain a POMDP setting as follows. Given an agent and an
environment, a discrete-time POMDP is defined by the seven-tuple (S,A, T ,R,O,G, γ) where S denotes the set of (hidden)
states of the environment, A denotes the set of actions of the agent, T denotes the set of conditional transition probabilities
between the states, R : S × A → R denotes the reward function that maps the state-action pairs to rewards, O denotes the
set of observations of the agent, G denotes the set of conditional observation probabilities, and γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes a discount
factor that indicates how much present rewards are preferred over the future rewards.
At each time t, the environment is in a particular hidden state st ∈ S . Obtaining an observation ot ∈ O depending on
the current state of the environment with the probability G(ot|st), the agent takes an action at ∈ A and receives a reward
rt = R(st, at) from the environment based on its action and the current state of the environment. At the same time, the
environment makes a transition to the next state st+1 with the probability T (st+1|st, at). The process is repeated until a
terminal state is reached. In this process, the goal of the agent is to determine an optimal policy pi : O → A that maps
observations to actions and maximizes the agent’s expected total discounted reward, i.e., E
[∑∞
t=0 γ
trt
]
. Equivalently, if an
agent receives costs instead of rewards from the environment, then the goal is to minimize the expected total discounted cost.
Considering the latter, the POMDP problem can be written as follows:
min
pi:O→A
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtrt
]
. (5)
Next, we explain the online attack detection problem in a POMDP setting. We assume that at an unknown time τ , a cyber-
attack is launched to the system and our aim is to detect the attack as quickly as possible after it occurs, where the attacker’s
capabilities/strategies are completely unknown. This defines a quickest change detection problem where the aim is to minimize
the average detection delay as well as the false alarm rate. This problem can, in fact, be expressed as a POMDP problem (see
Fig. 2). In particular, due to the unknown attack launch time τ , there are two hidden states: pre-attack and post-attack. At
each time t, after obtaining the measurement vector yt, two actions are available for the agent (defender): stop and declare an
attack or continue to have further measurements. We assume that whenever the action stop is chosen, the system moves into
a terminal state, and always stays there afterwards.
Furthermore, although the conditional observation probability for the pre-attack state can be inferred based on the system
model under normal operating conditions, since the attacking strategies are unknown, the conditional observation probability
for the post-attack state is assumed to be totally unknown. Moreover, due to the unknown attack launch time τ , state transition
probability between the pre-attack and the post-attack states is unknown.
Since our aim is to minimize the detection delays and the false alarm rate, both the false alarm and the detection delay events
should be associated with some costs. Let the relative cost of a detection delay compared to a false alarm event be c > 0.
Then, if the true underlying state is pre-attack and the action stop is chosen, a false alarm occurs and the defender receives a
cost of 1. On the other hand, if the underlying state is post-attack and the action continue is chosen, then the defender receives
a cost of c due to the detection delay. For all other (hidden) state-action pairs, the cost is assumed to be zero. Also, once the
action stop is chosen, the defender does not receive any further costs while staying in the terminal state. The objective of the
8Post-attackPre-attack
Terminal
continue continue
stop stop
t = τ
r = cr = 0
r = 1 r = 0
Fig. 2: State-machine diagram for the considered POMDP setting. The hidden states and the (hidden) transition between them
happening at time t = τ are illustrated with the dashed circles and the dashed line, respectively. The defender receives costs
(r) depending on its actions and the underlying state of the environment. Whenever the defender chooses the action stop, the
system moves into a terminal state and the defender receives no further cost.
defender is to minimize its expected total cost by properly choosing its actions. Particularly, based on its observations, the
defender needs to determine the stopping time at which an attack is declared.
Let Γ denote the stopping time chosen by the defender. Moreover, let Pk denote the probability measure if the attack is
launched at time k, i.e., τ = k, and let Ek denote the corresponding expectation. Note that since the attacking strategies are
unknown, Pk is assumed to be unknown. For the considered online attack detection problem, we can derive the expected total
discounted cost as follows:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtrt
]
= Eτ
[
11{Γ < τ}+
Γ∑
t=τ
c
]
= Eτ
[
11{Γ < τ}+ c (Γ− τ)+]
= Pτ ({Γ < τ}) + cEτ
[
(Γ− τ)+], (6)
where γ = 1 is chosen since the present and future costs are equally weighted in our problem, {Γ < τ} is a false alarm event
that is penalized with a cost of 1, and Eτ
[
(Γ − τ)+] is the average detection delay where each detection delay is penalized
with a cost of c and (·)+ = max(·, 0).
Based on (5) and (6), the online attack detection problem can be written as follows:
min
Γ
Pτ ({Γ < τ}) + cEτ
[
(Γ− τ)+]. (7)
Since c corresponds to the relative cost between the false alarm and the detection delay events, by varying c and solving the
corresponding problem in (7), a tradeoff curve between average detection delay and false alarm rate can be obtained. Moreover,
c < 1 can be chosen to prevent frequent false alarms.
Since the exact POMDP model is unknown due to unknown attack launch time τ and the unknown attacking strategies and
since the RL algorithms are known to be effective over uncertain environments, we follow a model-free RL approach to obtain
a solution to (7). Then, a direct mapping from observations to the actions, i.e., the stopping time Γ, needs to be learned. Note
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Fig. 3: A graphical description of the online attack detection problem in the smart grid. The measurements {yt} are collected
through smart meters and processed to obtain ot = f({yt}). The defender observes f({yt}) at each time t and decides on
the attack declaration time Γ.
that the optimal action is continue if the underlying state is pre-attack and stop if the underlying state is post-attack. Then, to
determine the optimal actions, the underlying state needs to be inferred using observations and the observation signal should
be well informative to reduce the uncertainty about the underlying state. As described in Sec. II, the defender observes the
measurements yt at each time t. The simplest approach can be forming the observation space directly with the measurement
vector yt but we would like to process the measurements and form the observation space with a signal related to the deviation
of system from its normal operation.
Furthermore, it is, in general, possible to obtain identical observations in the pre-attack and the post-attack states. This is
called perceptual aliasing and prevent us to make a good inference about the underlying state by only looking at the observation
at a single time. We further note that in our problem, deciding on an attack solely based on a single observation corresponds
to an outlier detection scheme for which more practical detectors are available not requiring a learning phase, see e.g., [25],
[26]. However, we are particularly interested in detecting sudden and persistent attacks/anomalies that more likely happen due
to an unfriendly intervention to the system rather than random disturbances due to high-level system noise realizations.
Since different states require different optimal actions, the ambiguity on the underlying state should be further reduced
with additional information derived from the history of observations. In fact, there may be cases where the entire history of
observations is needed to determine the optimal solution in a POMDP problem [38]. However, due to computational limitations,
only a finite memory can be used in practice and an approximately optimal solution can be obtained. A simple approach is
to use a finite-size sliding window of observations as a memory and map the most recent history window to an action, as
described in [22]. This approach is particularly suitable for our problem as well since we assume persistent attacks/anomalies
that happen at an unknown point of time and continue thereafter. That is, only the observations obtained after an attack are
significant from the attack detection perspective.
Let the function that processes a finite history of measurements and produces the observation signal be denoted with f(·)
so that the observation signal at time t is ot = f({yt}). Then, at each time, the defender observes f({yt}) and decides on
the stopping time Γ, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The aim of the defender is to obtain a solution to (7) by using an RL algorithm,
as detailed in the subsequent section.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
Firstly, we explain our methodology to obtain the observation signal ot = f({yt}). Note that the pdf of meter measurements
in the pre-attack state can be inferred using the baseline measurement model in (2) and the state estimates provided by the
Kalman filter. In particular, the pdf of the measurements under normal operating conditions can be estimated as follows:
yt ∼ N (Hxˆt|t, σ2w IK).
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The likelihood of measurements based on the baseline density estimate, denoted with L(yt), can then be computed as follows:
L(yt) = (2piσ
2
w)
−K2 exp
( −1
2σ2w
(yt −Hxˆt|t)T(yt −Hxˆt|t)
)
= (2piσ2w)
−K2 exp
( −1
2σ2w
ηt
)
,
where
ηt , (yt −Hxˆt|t)T(yt −Hxˆt|t) (8)
is the estimate of the negative log-scaled likelihood.
In case the system is operated under normal conditions, the likelihood L(yt) is expected to be high. Equivalently, small
(close to zero) values of ηt may indicate the normal system operation. On the other hand, in case of an attack/anomaly, the
system deviates from normal operating conditions and hence the likelihood L(yt) is expected to decrease in such cases. Then,
persistent high values of ηt over a time period may indicate an attack/anomaly. Hence, ηt may help to reduce the uncertainty
about the underlying state to some extent.
However, since ηt can take any nonnegative value, the observation space is continuous and hence learning a mapping from
each possible observation to an action is computationally infeasible. To reduce the computational complexity in such continuous
spaces, we can quantize the observations. We then partition the observation space into I mutually exclusive and disjoint intervals
using the quantization thresholds β0 = 0 < β1 < · · · < βI−1 < βI =∞ so that if βi−1 ≤ ηt < βi, i ∈ 1, . . . , I , the observation
at time t is represented with θi. Then, possible observations at any given time are θ1, . . . , θI . Since θi’s are representations of
the quantization levels, each θi needs to be assigned to a different value.
Furthermore, as explained before, although ηt may be useful to infer the underlying state at time t, it is possible to
obtain identical observations in the pre-attack and post-attack states. For this reason, we propose to use a finite history of
observations. Let the size of the sliding observation window be M so that there are IM possible observation windows and the
sliding window at time t consists of the quantized versions of {ηj : t−M + 1 ≤ j ≤ t}. Henceforth, by an observation o, we
refer to an observation window so that the observation space O consists of all possible observation windows. For instance, if
I = M = 2, then O = {[θ1, θ1], [θ1, θ2], [θ2, θ1], [θ2, θ2]}.
For each possible observation-action pair (o, a), we propose to learn a Q(o, a) value, i.e., the expected future cost, using
an RL algorithm where all Q(o, a) values are stored in a Q-table of size IM × 2. After learning the Q-table, the policy of
the defender will be choosing the action a with the minimum Q(o, a) for each observation o. In general, increasing I and
M may improve the learning performance but at the same time results in a larger Q table, that would require to increase the
number of training episodes and hence the computational complexity of the learning phase. Hence, I and M should be chosen
considering the expected tradeoff between performance and computational complexity.
The considered RL-based detection scheme consists of learning and online detection phases. In the literature, SARSA, a
model-free RL control algorithm [39], was numerically shown to perform well over the model-free POMDP settings [24].
Hence, in the learning phase, the defender is trained with many episodes of experience using the SARSA algorithm and a
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Algorithm 1 Learning Phase – SARSA Algorithm
1: Initialize Q(o, a) arbitrarily, ∀o ∈ O and ∀a ∈ A.
2: for e = 1 : E do
3: t← 0
4: s← pre-attack
5: Choose an initial o based on the pre-attack state and choose the initial a = continue.
6: while s 6= terminal and t < T do
7: t← t+ 1
8: if a = stop then
9: s← terminal
10: r ← 1 {t < τ}
11: Q(o, a)← Q(o, a) + α (r −Q(o, a))
12: else if a = continue then
13: if t >= τ then
14: r ← c
15: s← post-attack
16: else
17: r ← 0
18: end if
19: Collect the measurements yt.
20: Employ the Kalman filter using (3) and (4).
21: Compute ηt using (8) and quantize it to obtain θi if βi−1 ≤ ηt < βi, i ∈ 1, . . . , I .
22: Update the sliding observation window o with the most recent entry θi and obtain o′.
23: Choose action a′ from o′ using the -greedy policy based on the Q-table (that is being learned).
24: Q(o, a)← Q(o, a) + α (r +Q(o′, a′)−Q(o, a))
25: o← o′, a← a′
26: end if
27: end while
28: end for
29: Output: Q-table, i.e., Q(o, a), ∀o ∈ O and ∀a ∈ A.
Algorithm 2 Online Attack Detection
1: Input: Q-table learned in Algorithm 1.
2: Choose an initial o based on the pre-attack state and choose the initial a = continue.
3: t← 0
4: while a 6= stop do
5: t← t+ 1
6: Collect the measurements yt.
7: Determine the new o as in the lines 20–22 of Algorithm 1.
8: a← argminaQ(o, a).
9: end while
10: Declare an attack and terminate the procedure.
Q-table is learned by the defender. For training, a simulation environment is created and during the training procedure, at
each time, the defender takes an action based on its observation and receives a cost in return of its action from the simulation
environment, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Based on this experience, the defender updates and learns a Q-table. Then, in the online
detection phase, based on the observations, the action with the lowest expected future cost (Q value) is chosen at each time
using the previously learned Q-table. The online detection phase continues until the action stop is chosen by the defender.
Whenever stop is chosen, an attack is declared and the process is terminated.
Note that after declaring an attack, whenever the system is recovered and returned back to the normal operating conditions,
the online detection phase can be restarted. That is, once a defender is trained, no further training is needed. We summarize the
learning and the online detection stages in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. In Algorithm 1, E denotes the number of learning
episodes, T denotes the maximum length of a learning episode, α is the learning rate, and  is the exploration rate, where
the -greedy policy chooses the action with the minimum Q value with probability 1−  and the other action (for exploration
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Fig. 4: An illustration of the interaction between defender and the simulation environment during the learning procedure. The
environment provides an observation o based on its internal state s, the agent chooses an action a based on its observation and
receives a cost r from the environment in return of its action. Based on this experience, the defender updates Q(o, a). This
process is repeated many times during the learning procedure.
purposes during the learning process) with probability .
Since RL is an iterative procedure, same actions are repeated at each iteration (learning episode). The time complexity of an
RL algorithm can then be considered as the time complexity of a single iteration [40]. As the SARSA algorithm performs one
update on the Q-table at a time and the maximum time limit for a learning episode is T , the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(T ). Moreover, the overall complexity of the learning procedure is O(TE), as E is the number of learning episodes. Notice
that the time complexity does not depend on the size of the action and observation spaces. On the other hand, as I and/or
M increase, a larger Q-table needs to be learned, that requires to increase E for a better learning. Furthermore, the space
complexity (memory cost) of Algorithm 1 is M + 2 IM due to the sliding observation window of size M and the Q-table of
size IM × 2. Note that the space complexity is fixed over time. During the learning procedure, based on the smart grid model
and some attack models (that are used to obtain low-magnitude attacks that correspond to small deviations from the normal
system operation), we can obtain the measurement data online and the defender is trained with the observed data stream.
Hence, the learning phase does not require storage of large amount of training data as only a sliding observation window of
size M needs to be stored at each time.
In Algorithm 2, at each time, the observation o is determined and using the Q-table (learned in Algorithm 1), the corresponding
action a with the minimum cost is chosen. Hence, the complexity at a time is O(1). This process is repeated until the action
stop is chosen at the stopping time Γ. Furthermore, similarly to Algorithm 1, the space complexity of Algorithm 2 is M+2 IM .
Remark 1: Since our solution approach is model-free, i.e., it is not particularly designed for specific types of attacks, the
proposed detector does not distinguish between an attack and other types of persistent anomalies such as network topology
faults. In fact, the proposed algorithm can detect any attack/anomaly as long as effect of such attack/anomaly on the system is
at a distinguishable level, i.e., the estimated system states are at least slightly deviated from the actual system states. On the
other hand, since we train the agent (defender) with low-magnitude attacks with some known attack types (to create the effect
of small deviations from actual system operation in the post-attack state) and we test the proposed detector against various
cyber-attacks in the numerical section (see Sec. V), we lay the main emphasis on online attack detection in this study. In
general, the proposed detector can be considered as an online anomaly detection algorithm.
Remark 2: The proposed solution scheme can be applied in a distributed smart grid system, where the learning and detection
tasks are still performed in a single center but the meter measurements are obtained in a distributed manner. We briefly explain
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this setup as follows:
• In the wide-area monitoring model of smart grids, there are several local control centers and a global control center. Each
local center collects and processes measurements of a set of smart meters in its neighborhood, and communicates with
the global center and with the neighboring local centers.
• The system state is estimated in a distributed manner, e.g., using the distributed Kalman filter designed for wide-area
smart grids in [8].
• Let hTk ∈ RN be the kth row of the measurement matrix, i.e., HT = [h1, . . . ,hK ]. Then, estimate of the negative
log-scaled likelihood, ηt, can be written as follows (see (8)):
ηt =
K∑
k=1
(yk,t − hTk xˆt|t)2. (9)
By employing the distributed Kalman filter, the local centers can estimate the system state at each time t. Then, they can
compute the term (yk,t − hTk xˆt|t)2 for the meters in their neighborhood. Let the number of local centers be R and the
set of meters in the neighborhood of the rth local center be denoted with Sr. Then, ηt in (9) can be rewritten as follows:
ηt =
R∑
r=1
∑
k∈Sr
(yk,t − hTk xˆt|t)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηt,r
=
R∑
r=1
ηt,r.
• In the distributed implementation, each local center can compute ηt,r and report it to the global center, which then sums
{ηt,r, r = 1, 2, . . . , R} and obtain ηt.
• The learning and detection tasks (Algorithms 1 and 2) are then performed at the global center in the same way as explained
above.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup and Parameters
Simulations are performed on an IEEE-14 bus power system that consists of N+1 = 14 buses and K = 23 smart meters. The
initial state variables (phase angles) are determined using the DC optimal power flow algorithm for case-14 in MATPOWER
[41]. The system matrix A is chosen to be an identity matrix and the measurement matrix H is determined based on the
IEEE-14 power system. The noise variances for the normal system operation are chosen as σ2v = 10
−4 and σ2w = 2× 10−4.
For the proposed RL-based online attack detection scheme, the number of quantization levels is chosen as I = 4 and the
quantization thresholds are chosen as β1 = 0.95× 10−2, β2 = 1.05× 10−2, and β3 = 1.15× 10−2 via an offline simulation
by monitoring {ηt} during the normal system operation. Further, M = 4 is chosen, i.e., sliding observation window consists
of 4 entries. Moreover, the learning parameters are chosen as α = 0.1 and  = 0.1, and the episode length is chosen to be
T = 200. In the learning phase, the defender is firstly trained over 4× 105 episodes where the attack launch time is τ = 100
and then trained further over 4 × 105 episodes where τ = 1 to ensure that the defender sufficiently explores the observation
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Fig. 5: Average detection delay vs. probability of false alarm curves for the proposed algorithm and the benchmark tests in
case of a random FDI attack.
space under normal operating conditions as well as the attacking conditions. More specifically, since a learning episode is
terminated whenever the action stop is chosen and observations under an attack become available to the defender only for
t ≥ τ , we choose τ = 1 in the half of the learning episodes to make sure that the defender is sufficiently trained under the
post-attack regime.
To illustrate the tradeoff between the average detection delay and the false alarm probability, the proposed algorithm is
trained for both c = 0.02 and c = 0.2. Moreover, to obtain a detector that is robust and effective against small deviations
of measurements from the normal system operation, the defender needs to be trained with very low-magnitude attacks that
correspond to slight deviations from the baseline. For this purpose, some known attack types with low magnitudes are used.
In particular, in one half of the learning episodes, random FDI attacks are used with attack magnitudes being realizations
of the uniform random variable ±U [0.02, 0.06], i.e., bk,t ∼ U [0.02, 0.06], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀t ≥ τ . In the other half of
the learning episodes, random hybrid FDI/jamming attacks are used where bk,t ∼ U [0.02, 0.06], uk,t ∼ N (0, σk,t), and
σk,t ∼ U [2× 10−4, 4× 10−4], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀t ≥ τ .
B. Performance Evaluation
In this section, performance of the proposed RL-based attack detection scheme is evaluated and compared with some existing
detectors in the literature. Firstly, we report the average false alarm period, E∞[Γ], of the proposed detection scheme, i.e.,
the first time on the average the proposed detector gives an alarm although no attack/anomaly happens at all (τ = ∞). The
average false alarm periods are obtained as E∞[Γ] = 9.4696× 105 for c = 0.2 and E∞[Γ] = 7.9210× 106 for c = 0.02. As
expected, false alarm rate of the proposed detector reduces as the relative cost of the false alarm event, 1/c, increases.
Based on the optimization problem in (7), our performance metrics are the probability of false alarm, i.e., Pτ ({Γ < τ}), and
the average detection delay, i.e., Eτ
[
(Γ − τ)+]. Notice that both performance metrics depend on the unknown attack launch
time τ . Hence, in general, the performance metrics need to be computed for each possible τ . For a representative performance
illustration, we choose τ as a geometric random variable with parameter ρ such that P (τ = k) = ρ (1− ρ)k−1, k = 1, 2, 3, . . .
where ρ ∼ U [10−4, 10−3] is a uniform random variable.
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Fig. 6: Performance curves for the proposed algorithm and the benchmark tests in case of a structured “stealth” FDI attack.
With Monte Carlo simulations over 10000 trials, we compute the probability of false alarm and the average detection delay
of the proposed detector, the Euclidean detector [25], and the cosine-similarity metric based detector [26]. To obtain the
performance curves, we vary the thresholds of the benchmark tests and vary c for the proposed algorithm. To evaluate the
proposed algorithm, we use Algorithm 2 that makes use of the Q-tables learned in Algorithm 1 for c = 0.02 and c = 0.2.
Furthermore, we report the precision, recall, and F-score for all simulation cases. As the computation of these measures requires
computing the number of detected and missed trials, we define an upper bound on the detection delay (that corresponds to the
maximum acceptable detection delay) such that if the attack is detected within this bound we assume the attack is detected,
otherwise missed. As an example, we choose this bound as 10 time units. Then, we compute the precision, recall, and F-score
out of 10000 trials as follows:
Precision =
# trials (τ ≤ Γ ≤ τ + 10)
# trials (τ ≤ Γ ≤ τ + 10) + # trials (Γ < τ) ,
Recall =
# trials (τ ≤ Γ ≤ τ + 10)
# trials (τ ≤ Γ ≤ τ + 10) + # trials (Γ > τ + 10) ,
and
F-score = 2
Precision× Recall
Precision + Recall
,
where “# trials” means “the number of trials with”.
We evaluate the proposed and the benchmark detectors under the following attack scenarios:
1) Firstly, we evaluate the detectors against a random FDI attack where bk,t ∼ U [−0.07, 0.07], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ∀t ≥ τ .
The corresponding tradeoff curves are presented in Fig. 5.
2) We then evaluate the detectors against a structured “stealth” FDI attack [5], where the injected data bt lies on the column
space of the measurement matrix H. We choose bt = Hgt where gt , [g1,t, . . . , gN,t]T and gn,t ∼ U [0.08, 0.12],
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and ∀t ≥ τ . The corresponding performance curves are illustrated in Fig. 6.
3) Then, we evaluate the detectors in case of a jamming attack with zero-mean AWGN where uk,t ∼ N (0, σk,t) and
σk,t ∼ U [10−3, 2× 10−3], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ∀t ≥ τ . The corresponding tradeoff curves are presented in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7: Performance curves for the proposed algorithm and the benchmark tests in case of a jamming attack with AWGN.
4) Next, we evaluate the detectors in case of a jamming attack with jamming noise correlated over the meters where
ut ∼ N (0,Ut), Ut = ΣtΣTt , and Σt is a random Gaussian matrix with its entry at the ith row and the jth column is
Σt,i,j ∼ N (0, 8× 10−5). The corresponding performance curves are given in Fig. 8.
5) Moreover, we evaluate the detectors under a hybrid FDI/jamming attack where bk,t ∼ U [−0.05, 0.05], uk,t ∼ N (0, σk,t),
and σk,t ∼ U [5× 10−4, 10−3], ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ∀t ≥ τ . The corresponding tradeoff curves are presented in Fig. 9.
6) Then, we evaluate the detectors in case of a random DoS attack where the measurement of each smart meter become
unavailable to the system controller at each time with probability 0.2. That is, for each meter k, dk,t is 0 with probability
0.2 and 1 with probability 0.8 at each time t ≥ τ . The performance curves against the DoS attack are presented in
Fig. 10.
7) Further, we consider a network topology attack where the lines between the buses 9-10 and 12-13 break down. The
measurement matrix H¯t for t ≥ τ is changed accordingly. The corresponding tradeoff curves are given in Fig. 11.
8) Finally, we consider a mixed topology and hybrid FDI/jamming attack, where the lines between buses 9-10 and 12-13
break down for t ≥ τ and further, we have bk,t ∼ U [−0.05, 0.05], uk,t ∼ N (0, σk,t), and σk,t ∼ U [5 × 10−4, 10−3],
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ∀t ≥ τ . The corresponding performance curves are presented in Fig. 12.
Table II and Table III summarize the precision, recall, and F-score for the proposed RL-based detector for c = 0.2 and c = 0.02,
respectively against all the considered simulation cases above. Moreover, for the random FDI attack case, Fig. 13 illustrates the
precision versus recall curves for the proposed and benchmark detectors. Since we obtain similar results for the other attack
cases, we report the results for the random FDI attack case as a representative.
For almost all cases, we observe that the proposed RL-based detection scheme significantly outperforms the benchmark
tests. This is because through the training process, the defender learns to differentiate the instantaneous high-level system noise
from persistent attacks launched to the system. Then, the trained defender is able to significantly reduce its false alarm rate.
Moreover, since the defender is trained with low attack magnitudes, it becomes sensitive to detect small deviations of the
system from its normal operation. On the other hand, the benchmark tests are essentially outlier detection schemes making
sample-by-sample decisions and hence they are unable to distinguish high-level noise realizations from real attacks that makes
such schemes more vulnerable to false alarms. Finally, in case of DoS attacks, since the meter measurements become partially
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noise correlated over the space.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
RL-based Detector
Euclidean Detector
Cos-Sim Detector
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
10-3
0.05
0.06
0.07
Fig. 9: Performance curves for the proposed algorithm and the benchmark tests in case of a hybrid FDI/jamming attack.
unavailable so that the system greatly deviates from its normal operation, all detectors are able to detect the DoS attacks with
almost zero average detection delays (see Fig. 10).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, an online cyber-attack detection problem is formulated as a POMDP problem and a solution based on the
model-free RL for POMDPs is proposed. The numerical studies illustrate the advantages of the proposed detection scheme
in fast and reliable detection of cyber-attacks targeting the smart grid. The results also demonstrate the high potential of RL
algorithms in solving complex cyber-security problems. In fact, the algorithm proposed in this paper can be further improved
using more advanced methods. Particularly, the following directions can be considered as future works:
• compared to the finite-size sliding window approach, more sophisticated memory techniques can be developed,
• compared to discretizing the continuous observation space and using a tabular approach to compute the Q values,
linear/nonlinear function approximation techniques, e.g., neural networks, can be used to compute the Q values,
• and deep RL algorithms can be useful to improve the performance.
Finally, we note that the proposed online detection method is widely applicable to any quickest change detection problem
where the pre-change model can be derived with some accuracy but the post-change model is unknown. This is, in fact,
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Fig. 11: Performance curves for the proposed algorithm and the benchmark tests in case of a network topology attack.
commonly encountered in many practical applications where the normal system operation can be modeled sufficiently accurately
and the objective is the online detection of anomalies/attacks that are difficult to model. Moreover, depending on specific
applications, if real post-change, e.g., attack/anomaly, data can be obtained, the real data can be further enhanced with simulated
data and the training can be performed accordingly, that would potentially improve the detection performance.
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